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ABSTRACT
Suppose Yn is a sequence of i.i.d. random variables taking values in Y, a complete, separable, non-finite metric
space. The probability law indexed by 9 e 0, is unknown to a Bayesian statistician with prior |i, observing this
process. Generalizing Freedman [1965, Annals of Mathematical Statistics], we show that "generically" (i.e., for a
residual family of (0, \i) pairs) the posterior beliefs do not weakly converge to a point-mass at the "tiue" 9.
Furthermore, for every open set G c 6, generically, the Bayesian will attach probability arbitrarily close to one to G
infinitely often.
The above result is applied to a two-armed bandit problem with geometric discounting where arm k yields an
outcome in a complete, separable metric space Y^. If the infimum of the possible rewards from playing arm k is
less than the infimum from playing arm k', then arm k is (generically) chosen only finitely often. If the infimum of
the rewards are equal, then both arms are played infinitely often.
JEL Classification Numbers: 022, 026, 211.

1. INTRODUCnON
There has been a flurry of interest in studying the asymptotic dynamics of Bayesian learning and control in
economic environments. In one set of papers including Easley and Kiefer (1988), Easley and Kiefer (1989), Kiefer
and Nyarko (1988), Kiefer and Nyarko (1989), McLennan (1987), Feldman and McLennan (1989), and Bikhchandani
and Sharma (1990), the authors analyze single agent decision problems in which there is a tradeoff between current
period expected reward and the expected value of the information generated by the current period action. In another
strand of the literature, Blume and Easley (1984), Bray and Kreps (1987), Feldman (1987a), and Feldman (1987b)
focus on properties of the tail of the sequence of beliefs and outcomes for economies with many passively learning
agents. Specifically, these latter papers consider whether Bayesian learning by agents with a correct specification of
the underlying structure but uncertainty regarding the parameter values is a sufficient condition to assure convergence
to a stationary rational expectations equilitnium.
These articles, as well as important earlier contributions of Cyert and DeGroot (1973), Rothschild (1974), and
Townsend (1978), have the following common framework. From the vantage point of the economic actors, the set
of possible complete descriptions of the relevant time-invariant economic data can be represented as a separable
metric space with Borel a-field fl(9). The actors in the model, uncertain as to the "true" 6o g ©, have prior beliefs
II on (0, fl(0))^ and an induced probability P^ on an infinite horizon outcome space. Denote by {|it) the sequence
of posterior beliefs. A result common to this literature is a "theorem" that with probability one |Xt => M<«., where \i»
is the posterior probabililty conditioned on the limit sub-a-field.
In most of the recent papers (exceptions are Feldman and McLennan (1989) and Bikhchandani and Sharma
(1990)), this a.s. convergence is established by using the fact that the the sequence of posterior beliefs are a
martingale with respect to the probability P^. It follows from the Martingale Convergence Theorem that with P^
probability one, the Bayesian beliefs converge to some (possibly random) limit belief.. In contrast, consider the
distribution of outcomes and beliefs with respect to the probability measure Pgq, the probability induced by the
"true" parameter 6o. Intuitively, Pqq is the belief of a passive observer who attaches probability one to Go being the
truth. One might also inquire as to whether convergence of Bayesian beliefs is obtained with respect to the measure
Pqq. a major point of this paper is to stress that without additional conditions, the answer is negative.
To elaborate on this distinction, suppose that in period t = 0, 1, ... , agents observe outcomes in a separable
metric space Y. Given the behavioral rules of the agents, each parameter value e induces a probability measure
Pq on the product space Y°°. The prior |j, induces a measure Pp. on Y** defined by P|i(A) = I Pe(A)P|j^(d0). The
application of the Martingale Convergence Theorem yields a.s. convergence of (Ht) . where the a.s. statement is with
respect to the probability measure P|i. But this does not imply that for any particular 9 that Ht => ^oo with Pq
probability one, even if 9 is in the support of |i.
One might hope to estabUsh a result that for a "large" class of priors, posteriors converge for a "large" class of
parameter values. When can be embedded in finite-dimensional Euclidean space, one has recourse to Lebesgue
measure m (restricted to 0) as a natural notion of size. Then if m « |i. the exceptional 9 set (9: Pe((|it=/> |i}) < 1},
has m measure zero. But in many naturally occurring settings 6 is not finite dimensional, and since there is no
infinite dimensional analogue of Lebesgue measure, a measure-theoretic critaion is unavailable.
In lieu of a reference measure to evaluate size, the customary procedure is to resort to the topological notion of
category. Residual subsets are deemed to be large or generic, and subsets of first category (which are complements of
residual subsets) are regarded as small. Freedman (1965) proved that when outcomes are I.I.D. taking values in a
countable set, that for a residual set of parameter values and (niors, post^ca* beliefs do not converge. In Section 3 of
this paper we extend Freedman's result to outcomes in non-finite, complete, separable metric spaces.
Using the results of Section 3, in Sections 4 and 5 of the paper we analyze a two-armed bandit problem with
geometric discounting where arm k yields an outcome in a complete, separable metric space Y^. If the infimum of
the possible rewards from playing arm k is less than the infunum from playing arm k', then for a residual family of
parameter values and priors, arm k is with Pg probabilty one chosen only fmitely often. If the infimum of the
rewards are equal, then both arms are played infinitely often.
2. NOTATION AND MATHEMATICAL PRELIMINARIES
2.1. Notational Conventions and Definitions
The set of real numbers is denoted by R. If X is a topological space, then the Borel a-field is denoted by 5(X).
The set of probability measures on (X. B(X)) is denoted by i'(X). For x e X, the Dirac measure 6x e P(X) is
defined by 5x(A) = 1 if x e A.
If (X, d) is a metric space, f: X -^ R is a Lipschitz function if for some K < «>, supx,ty {lf(x) - f(y)l/d(x,y)) <
K. If f is Lipschitz, the Lipschitz seminorm IIHIl is defined IIAIl = supx^y{if(x) - f(y)l/d(x,y)). If f is a bounded
Lipschitz function, the bounded Lipschitz norm is IIHIbl = Hf'L + HA'- where llflU denotes the usual sup norm. The
set of all real-valued, bounded Lipschitz functions on (X, d) is denoted by BL(X, d). Endowed with the bounded
Lipschitz norm, BL(X, d) is a Banach space (see e.g. Dudley (1989, Section 1 1.2)).
The dual bounded Lipschitz or Dudley medic P on /'(X) is defined by
P(P, Q) = sup{ljf dP - jf dQI: llfllBL^ 1).
for P, Q G PCX). If X is separable, P metrizes the topology of weak convergence on P(X). Further details on the
properties of P can be found in Dudley (1966) and Dudley (1989).
2.2. A BriefReview ofBaire Category Theory
For ease of reference, we summarize some needed facts pertaining to Baire category. Standard references include
Kelley (1985, pp. 200-203), Oxtoby (1980) and Royden (1988, Section 7.8). Let X be a metric space. A set E c X
is nowhere dense if E has empty interior. A set E is oi first category or meager if it is the union of a countable
collection of nowhere dense sets. If a set is not of first category then it is of second category. The complement of a
set of first category is a residual set.
According to the Theorem of Baire Royden (1988, Theorem 7.27), if X is a complete metric space then the
intersection of a countable family of open dense subsets of X is itself a dense subset of X.
3. GENERIC NONCOI^TVERGENCE OF POSTERIORS WITH I.I.D. OUTCOMES
IN COMPLETE, SEPARABLE METRIC SPACES
3.1. Assumptions and Results
We first describe an index set A and a sequence Zi, Z2, ... of i.i.d. random variables defined on a probability
space (E, S, Px) where A. e A. The natural interpretation will be that the outcomes are sequentially observed by a
Bayesian statistician for whom the "true" X is initially unknown and has prior belief \i. Building upon the work of
Freedman (1965), we will investigate the topological size of the set of pairs (X, \i) for which the sequence of
Bayesian posterior beliefs converges Px a.s. or in Px probability to some limit posterior belief.
The sequence (Zn) takes values in Z, a non-finite, complete, separable metric space with Borel a-field B(Z). The
probability distribution of Zn is an element of A = {A, e P(Zy. A,« v), where v is a a-finite measure on (Z, B{Z))
with non-finite support Without loss of generality we work in representation space and so define S = Z~, S = B{Z)
X fi(Z) X ... , and Px = A. X A, X ... . The function Z,,: I -> Z is the projection of Z onto Z, defined by Zn(zi, Z2,
...) = Zn.
To address the question of convergence of posterior beliefs we need topologies on A and /'(A). We will make use
of two topologies on A, the total variation topology^ and the topology of weak convergence.^.^ is induced by
the O metric di defined by di(X, X.') = hr" - ~r^ dv. An essential fact is that (A, di) is a complete, separablef|dX di/,
J dv dv
metric space. (Completeness follows from the completeness of L^Z, B(Z), v), and for separability see e.g., Strasser
(1985, Lemma 4.1).) In contrast, defining Pa as the Dudley metric on A (which generates the topology ^), the
metric space (A, ^\) is separable, but not complete. Conveniently, the Borel a-field of (A,^ is the same as the
Borel a-field of (A, ^) (see Strasser (1985, Theorem 4.7). So without ambiguity we can denote the Borel sets of A
by B(A).
A prior distribution is a probability measure |i on (A, B(A)). As indicated above, informally one can imagine
that there is a Bayesian statistician who may not know the "true" X., but has a prior n. Since A has two topologies,
there are two weak topologies on f(A) denoted in the obvious way by 3^ and 3^, with^ weaker than 5?*f • ^
and 9f generate the same a-field, which we denote by B{P(A)). Convergence with respect to the 3*f topology is
W
denoted by ^>. Convergence with respect to the SR^ topology is denoted by ^. In this section of the paper the
symbol |3 denotes the Dudley metric on f(A) with respect to the di metric on A.. It follows from Billingsley (1968,
p. 239) and Dudley (1989, Corollary 11.5.5)) that the metric space (P(A), P) is complete and separable with p
generating the topology 9f
.
The updating rule f: P{A) x Z -> P(A) is a measurable function with the property that for each \i e /'(A),
r(^, •) is a regular version of conditional probability with respect to the prior probability [i. The existence of such a
function is established by Dynkin and Yushkevich (1979, p. 263). The n-period updating rule is Fn: PiA) x Z -»
P(A), recursively defined by ri(|i, a) = TQi, Zi(a)) and TnCn, <J) = nPn-iCn, a), Zn(a)) for n > 2.
A pair (A., ji) g A x P{A) is .^Y-co/iiwre/ir if Px,((cr: TnC^i, a) =* 8x,}) = 1. A pair (X, |i) g A x P(A) is .^-
consistent if Px({ct: TnOi, a) => 6x.}) = 1. (When v has countable support,^ =^ and so the two definitions of
consistency are identical.) Freedman (1%3) proved that when Z is finite and \i has full support, that (A,, ji) is
consistent for all X e /"(A). It would be natural to conjecture a similar result for when Z is not finite. Indeed, the
consistency result for the finite outcome case has been generalized in a well-known paper of Schwartz (1965) and
more recendy by Barron (1988). However, Freedman (1965) demonstrated that in a topolological sense "most" pairs
are not consistent (in either sense) when v has countable support, even if is required that the prior p. has full support
More precisely, defining S = (p. e /"(A): supp H = A) , Freedman proved the striking result that there exist sets R\ c
A and Rp{\) c S, residual in A and P{\) respectively (which implies that R\ x Rp{\) is residual in A x f(A)), such
that fOT (X, ]x)e^ R\y. Rp{\):
limsup IfnOJ., ct)(G) Px(da) = 1, for all nonempty open subsets G c A. A corollary is that for (X, n) in the
n->«*
J.
residual set ^a x ^p(a), PX({ct: ^n(^l, a) => 5x)) = 0.
In the next subsection we show that these non-convergence results of Freedman (1965) extend to the case where
v is any a-finite measure with non-fmite support. Endowing A with the di metric, and defining ^ = [(k, |j.) e A x
P{\): limsm) \Tn(n., a)(G) Px(da) = 1 for all open G c A) , we prove the following theorem and corollary.
THEOREM 3.10. .58 is a residual subset of A x f(A). Furthermore, defining S = (p e P{K): supp n = A) and JSs =
i? n (A X S),
.^s is a residual subset of A x P{\).
COROLLARY 3.11. All (X, n) G .^ are neither .^ ot 5^-consistenL
3.2. Proof ofTheorem and Corollary
While the basic structure of the proof is closely resembles the proof of Freedman (1965) of his Theorem, some
modification and extension is required to adapt the argument to cover a non-discrete outcome space. In particular.
Proposition 3.5 requires a different method of proof than the comparable intermediate result in Freedman (1965).
We start with some definitions. Unless otherwise indicated, where relevant it should be understood that A is
endowed with the^ topology. Define h: A x Z ^ R as (fl(A) x 5(Z)) measurable function such that h(A„ •) is a
density for X with respect to v (a proof of existence of such a function is provided by Strasser (1985, Lemma 4.6)).
Let A+ = {X. e A: h(X, z) > 0, v a.e.) and define Aq = -A+. The set of probability measures on (A, B(A)) that
assign strictly positive probability to A+ is P+{h) =[\i& /'(A): |i(A+) > 0).
A+ and /'+(A) are topologically "large" in the sense that each is a residual subset of a complete, separable metric
space. In contrast, Aq and /'(Aq) = (h g P(A): h(Ao) = 1) are of first category, albeit dense in respectively A and
PW.
LEMMA 3.1. A+ c A and P+(A) c P(A) are respectively dense G5 (and hence residual) subsets ofA and P+(,A). Aq
c A and P(.Aq) c: P(A) are dense sets offirst category.
Proof, (i) We first establish the properties of A+ and P(A+). Define AJ = {X e A: v({z: h(k, z) = 0)) < j'^ ) for j = 1,
2 aJ is an open, dense subset of A. So by the Baire Category Theorem (see e.g., Royden (1988, Theorem
7.27)) A+ = n.^ AJ is a dense G5 set and hence residual (Royden (1988, Theorem 7.30)).
The claim that P+(,A) is a dense G5, follows from Theorem 3.15 of Dubins and Freedman (1964). (Dubins and
Freedman have a compactness assumption in Section 3 of their paper, but inspection of their proof reveals that
completeness and separability is a sufficient condition.)
(ii) We now verify the properties of Aq and P{Aq). Since Aq = -A+ and /'(Aq) = ~P+iA), and A+ and P+{A) are
residual, by definition Aq and /'(Aq) are of first category. To prove denseness, for arbitrary A, e A choose a sequence
X^ -* A, such that h(k^, z ) = on a set of positive v measure and h(X.^, ) converges in v measure to h(k, ). (The
existence of such a sequence follows from the fact that for every a e [0, 1] there exists Aq g B(Z) such that a =
|h(X, z) v(dz).) But then X^ -^ X, establishing the denseness of Aq. The density of /'(Aq) now follows from
Aa
Theorem 11.6.3 of Parthasarathy (1967).
Let D = (ai, 02, ... ) be a countable, dense subset of A+ and hence dense subset of A. We now construct a
sequence Mi, M2, ... with M^ c P{A) such that for all A. e A+ and |i. e M^, fnOi, ct) converges Px as. to Saj^,
the Dirac measure on Uk- Proceeding, we define M^ c P(A) by M^ = (n e /'(A): (i) \i has finite support, (ii)
^({ak}) > 0, and (iii) \i{Ao) = 1 - n({ak) }. The set M c f(A) is defined by M = Uj^^j Mk-
LEMMA 3.2. For k = 1, 2, ... , Mk « a dense subset ofP{A).
Proof. Select a^e D, p. e P{A) and define Z = (y e P(A): supp y is finite, and 7(Ao) = 1 ) . Since Aq is dense in A
(Lemma 2.1), by Theorem 11.6.3 of Parthasarathy (1967), E is dense in P(A). So there exists 7^ => |i., with y" e
H. Define ji'" = m"l-5a^ + (1 - m"^)-7^. Since p.'" e Mk and ji"' => (i, the proof is complete.
Given the above definitions, it is intuitive that if the prior |i. e Mk and Xq e A+, then with P\q probability
one, any a priori alternative to Xq will eventually be deemed impossible and the posterior belief will converge to
8ak-
LEMMA 3.3. For Xoe A+andiie Mk, Pf^Ho € Z: rn(M, o) => Sa^}) = 1.
Proof Suppose supp \i = (Ok, Xi, X2, ..., Xj] where Xj g Aq for j = 1 J. Let Aj = (z g Z: h(Xj, z) = 0). Define
the exceptional set Ej = (a = (zi, Z2, ...) g Z: Zk « Aj for k = 1, 2, ...). PXo(Ej) = 0. and fora « Ej, TnOi. cr)({Xj))
> only finitely often. Since {Xi, ..., Xj) is finite, fndi, cT)({ak)) < 1 only finitely often.
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Now for k = 1, 2, ... , let [Oicm]jj^i be a decreasing sequence of open subsets of A with 6^^+; c Oicm and
''^r^lOkm = [o-k.]- Let gkm: A -* R be a bounded Lipschitz function such that llgkin"BL ^ 1. gkm equals one on
Ok,m+l and vanishs on -Okm- The existence of functions satisfying these conditions follows from Proposition
11.2.3 of Dudley (1989).
LEMMA 3.4. //Xo e A+and\ie Mfc, then Lirn^ C[ Jgkm(^) TnOi, a)(dX)] n^ida) = 1.
Q
/'roo/. Define GicnmCcf) = |gkm(^)rn(^, crXdX). Applying Lemma 3.3 and the definition of weak convergence,
A
Lim GjonnC*') = 1. PXfl a.s.. So by the Dominated Convergence The<Mem, Lim j Gkjnn(cf) PXo(da) = 1.
For arbitrary prior beliefs |i. e P(A) and 'true' parameter X g A, the probability law (with respect to the
measurePx ) of the posterior mapping Fndi, ): S -» P{A) may vary with the choice of versions of conditional
probability. It is easily confirmed, however, that if n g P+(A) then with P\ probability one, any two versions of
conditional probability will agree. The next task is to verify that if we restrict attention to prior beliefs n g P+iA),
then from the perspective of statistical observer who "knows" X, the expected value of the Bayesian's posterior
expectation of gkm is a continuous function of the prior \i and the true parameter \. This is a lengthy exercise with
the details provided in the Appendix. Since P+iA) is a residual set, for the purposes of this paper this restricted
continuity result suffices.
PROPOSITION 3.5. The function OKnu,: A x P+(A) -> R defined by
Z
Proof. See Appendix.
*^)cmn(^. \i-)= \ JglunC^') TnOi, o)(.dX') Px(da), is continuousfor all k, m and n.
'a
The remaining steps needed for the proof of Theorem 3. 11 mimic Freedman (1965). To make the p^)er self-
contained, modulo notational changes (and filling in some details) we replicate Freedman's ingenious argument
Define for k, j, m, n = 1, 2, ... , the set RKmjn c A x P+(A) by:
RKmjn ={(>.. ^i) G A X P+{A): ([ jgkm(X') T^i^y, a)(dX')] Px(da) < 1 - j'^ }
.
Z
And define 5^ \j^^ ^m=l "^jr*! '~^^\ ^Kmjn- The set of (X, \i) pairs such that with P^ probability one, the
Bayesian's posterior belief essentially concentrates in every open A set infinitely often is:
i? = {(X, ^) G A X P{A): limsup Jrn(u, ci)(G) Px(da) = 1, V open G c A).
To aid the reader, we outline the structure of the remainder of the proof. In Proposition 3.6 and 3.7 we
establish that; (i) 9^is of first category in A x /'+(A), and (ii) that [A x /'+(A)]\^ c 9^implying that iS is
-9-
residual in [A x P+(A)]. In conjunction with the fact that a residual subset of a residual subspace is residual (a
consequence of Lemma 3.9), this establishes that^ is residual in A x P(A).
PROPOSITION 3.6. For all k,m,j>l, Oj^^j Ricmjn " ^ relatively closed, nowhere dense subset ofAx P+{A). 9^
is offirst category tn A x P+(A).
Proof. By Proposition 3.5, RKmjn is closed in A x P+(A) and so n^-^ RKmjn is closed in A x P+(A). By Lemma
3.4, if (X, n) € A+ X Mk then (X, |i) « n^~j RKmjn- By Lemma 3.2 A+ x Mfc is dense in A x P+(A), and so
'^n=i ^Kmjn is nowhere dense in A x P+(A). Since r^J^^ Ricmjn is a closed, nowhere dense subset of A x P+(A),
9^is a countable union of closed, nowhere dense sets, and so is of first category in A x P+(A).
PROPOSITION 3.7. [A X P+(A)] \i? c ^T
Proof. Suppose (A., p.) e [Ax P+{A)]\.9S . Then there exists e > and an open set G c A, such that
limsupn jrn(p, CT)(G) Px(da) < 1 - e. Choose k and m so that {X': gkm(^') > 0) c G. Choose j so that
n
1 - j-l > 1 - e and choose no so that for all ji > no, jrn(|i, ct)(G) Px(da) < 1 - j"^. Then (k, n) e Rkmjn and so
(X., \i) € (^n^ Ricmjn. which by the definition of 9'lmplies that (X, |i) g 3?"
COROLLARY 3.8. i? n [A x /'+(A)] w a residual subset of Ax P+{A) in the relative topology.
Proof By Propositions 3.6 and 3.7, [A x P+{A)]\.^ is of first category in A x P+(A), so the relative complement
Rn[Ax P+{A)] is residual in A x P+(A). U
LEMMA 3.9. Suppose (Y, T) is a topological space and (Yq, U) is a subspace where U is the relative topology.
(i)If AcYQis nowhere dense in (Yq, U) then A is nowhere dense in (Y, T).
(ii) IfYo is a residual subset ofY and B c Yq is residual in (Yq, U) then B is a residual subset ofY.
Proof, (i) Suppose A is not nowhere dense in Y. Then there is an open set G c Y with G c A. Furthermore,
G n Yq c A n Yq = cIyqA, the closure of A in (Yq, f/), where the equality follows from Theorem 1.16 of Kelley
(1985). But this contradicts A being nowhere dense in Yq.
(ii) To establish that B is residual in Y, observe that there exists a sequence of sets[Ai) with Ai c Yq, YqNB = ui
A,, and Ai nowhere dense in (Yq, U). So by (i). A, is nowhere dense in Y, implying that Yo\B is of first category in
Y, so Yo\B u Y\Yo is of first category in Y, and B = ~(Yo\B u Y\Yo) is residual in Y.
/'roo/o/THEOREM 3.10. By Lemma 3.1, P+(A) is a residual subset of /"(A). So by Theorem 15.3 of Oxtoby
(1980), A X P+{A) is a residual subset of A x P{A). By Corollary 3.8, 3S n [A x P+{A)] is a residual subset of A
X P(A), and so by Lemma 3.9, .^ n [A x P+(A)] is a residual subset of A x P{A). This completes the proof that
-10-
^ is a residual subset of A x f(A). Applying Theorem 3.13 of Dubins and Freedman (1964), S is a residual subset
of P(A), and by Oxtoby (1980, Theorem 15.3) A x S is a residual subset of A x P(A). So i? n (A x S) = ^S is
residual.
/'roo/o/COROLLARY 3.11. Pick (X, \i)e ^,E>0, and choose a set G c A open in the^ topology with ^-
closure G such that X e G. Since (X, \i) e ^, P\ a.s. rn(M. cr)(G) > 1 - e infinitely often, rn(n, a)(_ G) < e i.o..
But by the standard characterization of weak convergence (see e.g., Billingsley (1968, Theorem 2.1)) this implies
that Tndi, o) does not converge => to 5x.. And since 9^ is weaker than SPf , TnOJ., a) does not converge => to 5x.
4. AN APPUCATION: INHNITE HORREDN BANDIT PROBLEMS WITH DISCOUNTEsfG
4.1. Introduction
In this section we model a Bayesian decision-maker who faces an infinite-horizon two-armed bandit problem and
geometrically discounts future rewards. In a well-known article Rothschild (1974) applied the bandit framework to
model the decision-making of a monopolist who could charge one of two prices and was uncertain of the distribution
of demand associated with each price. An extended discussion of economic applications of bandit problems in
provided by Kiefer (1989)
To orient the reader we first provide an informal description of the Bayesian's optimization problem. We then
formally define the relevant probability spaces and reformulate the decision-problem as a dynamic programming
problem. Using the Gittens Index, we provide a simple characterization the behavioral rules of the decision-maker. In
Section 5, we apply Theorem 3.10 to describe the asymptotic behavior of the decision-maker.
Time periods are indexed by t = 0, 1 , 2, .... In period t the decision-maker selects an action or bandit-arm x(t) €
X= {xi,X2). After choosing action x(t) = xk, the realization y(t)e Y^ of a random element Y(t) is observed, and a
period reward rk(y(t)) is received. Conditional upon the Bayesian choosing x(t) = xj^, the probability distribution of
Y(t) is an element of 9k e e^ c /'(Y^). Defining Y = Yi u Y2, and r: X x Y -* R by r(xk, y) = rk(y), the total
00
reward or utility from the stream (x(0), y(0), x(l), y(l), x(2), ... ) is X"''r(x(t), y(t)),where the discount factor a €
t=0
[0, 1).
The decision-maker may initially be uncertain of the "true" 9i and 62. Defining © = ©i x ©2. her initial beliefs
are given by a prior probability \l g P(©). Since the decion-maker's choice of action at time t may be influenced by
previously observed random outcomes, the action x(t) is the realization of a random variable X(t). A policy is a
sequence of random variables {X(t)) taking values in X, that are measurable with respect to the information (i.e.,
sub-a-fields) generated by past outcomes. The objective of the decision-maker is to select a policy that maximizes
00
E^[Xa'"^r(X(t), Y(t))], where the symbol E^l (informally) denotes expectation with respect to a probability
t=l
measure on the underlying probability space consistent with the prior \l.
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4.2. Formal Specification of the Probability Spaces
The set Yjc of outcomes that might arise from selecting action xk is a non-finite, complete, separable metric
space with Borel a-field B(Y^. Define^ = Y\^xY^x... with F^ the corresponding product a-field. We write F^,
for the n-fold product a-field B(Yk) x B(Yk) x . . . x fi(Yk) with F^o = {Qk. ) • The measurable space (Q, F) is
defined by £i = Qi x Q2. and F = F; x F2. The projection function n^: N x Q^ ^ Yk is defined by 7tk(j, (Oki.
C0k2. ••• ) = t^kj- The interpretation of Qk 'S that for (Ok e Qk. JtlcCJ. 'Ok) is the outcome on the j'th occasion that
action Xk is selected. Slightly abusing notation, when convenient we treat n^Q, •) as a function from i2 to Y defined
by TCkCJ. wi. 0)2) = rtkO. c^j)-
The set of a priori possible probabiUty laws on (Yk. F^) is Bk = {9k e ^(60: Ok« vk) . where Vk is a a-finite
measure on (Yk, fi(Yk)) with non-finite support The reward function rk: Yk -^ R is a bounded, measurable function
with ess inf rk(yk) = sup{a e R: vk({yk: n^\d < a)) = 0) = bk, and ess sup HcCyk) = inf(a g R: Vk({yk: HcCyk) > a))
= 0) = Ck- We define lltkll = max {Ibkl, Ickl}.
With dk the L^ metric on Gk, (©k. dk) is a complete, separable metric space. For 0k e 0k, the product measure
6k X Ok X ... on (Qk, Fk) is denoted by Pk,ek- The product space (9, d©) is defined by 9 = 61 x 62 where de is a
metric that metrizes the product toplogy. The Borel a-field is B(e) = B(ei) x ^(82). For 9 = (Gi, 62) e 6, the
product probability measure Pe on (i^, F) is defined by Pe = Pi.9i x P2,e2-
In order to make use of Gittens Index machinery, we require that observing an outcome from arm k provides no
information regarding the probability law governing arm k', for k ^ k'. More formally the prior belief must be a
product probability on (9,^(9)). Define n(9) = {n € F(9): ^ = Hi x ji2, s.t. m e F(9i), ^2 e Pi^l)]-
Identifying |i = |J.i x |j.2 g ri(9) by the vector (jii, 112) of marginals, no confusion should arise from writing (jii,
|i2) instead of \i\ x H2- The projection functions Pk: n(9) -^ F(9k) are defined by Pk((M^l. [i-l)) = Wc-
Corresponding to a prior \i are induced probability measures P^ and Q^ on respectively (0,F) and
(9 X Q, B(9) X F). For h = (m, H2) g 11(9), Q^ is defined on measurable rectangles by Q^(A x B) =
fPe(B) MXd9) for A G fl(0) and B g F. By the Product Measure Theorem (see Ash (1972, Theorem 2.6.2)) there is
A
a unique extension onto 5(9) x F. P^ is defined by P^(B) = P^(9 x B) for every B g F. From the perspective of
the Bayesian decision-maker who has prior |i, the relevant probability spaces are (il, F, P^) and (9 x Q,, B(9) x F,
Q^). But from the perspective of a classical statistician, the probability space on which all random variables are
defined is (fi, F, Pq) where 9 = (9i, 92) e 9 is the "u^e" parameter.
4.3. Histories and Policies
We now provide a precise statement of the optimization problem from the perspective of the decision-maker.
We start by defining an admissible plan. It will be convenient to include in our definition, "count functions"
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Ck(t): Q -^ {0, 1, 2, ... ), for k = 1, 2 and t = 0, 1, 2, ... . The realization Ck(t){(o) will be interpretable as the
number of occasions that arm k has been chosen through time L
The indicator function I^: X -» {0, 1 ) is defined by l^(x) = 1 iff x = x^. An admissible plan is a tuple [{X(t))
,
{Y(t)). {Ci(t)). {C2(t)), [H,]] where for t = 0, 1, 2, ... . X(t): Q -> X, Y(t): Q -» Y, Ck(t): Q -* (0, 1, ... ).
and [Ht] is a sequence of sub-a-fields ofF , such that
i) Ho =10,0)
ii) X(t): 0->X isHt measurable,
iii) for t > 1, //, = //,./ V a(X(t-l), Y(t-l)).
iv)Ck(0) = Ik(X(0)).
v) Ck(t) = Ck(t-l) + Ik(X(t)) for t > 1. and
vi) if X(t)(o)) = Xk and Ck((o) = n, then Y(t)((coi, (02)) = Jtk(n. ^k).
For a G (0, 1). an admissible plan [{X(t)}, { Y(t)). (Ci(t)), {C2(t)], [H,]] is (11. a)-optimal if for any other
admissible plan [{X(t)'). {Y(t)'). {Ci(t)'}. (€2(1)'), {///}]:
[Sat-iT(X(t)((o), Y(t)(a)))] P^,{d(o) >
t=l
[IaH-r(X(t)'(co), Y(t)'((o))] Pn(d(o).'
t=l
4.4. Reformulation as a Bayesian Dynamic Programming Problem
In this section we recast the decision-maker's optimization problem as a Bayesian dynamic programming
problem with the state at time t being the Bayesian's posterior probability |J.(t) = (iti(t), |i2(0) ^ n(e). As in
Blackwell (1965), a dynamic programming problem is defined as a quintuple [X, u, n(9), 9, a], where the action
space X, the discount factor a e [0, 1) and the state space 0(6) are as previously defined. The expected reward
function for arm k is Uk: ^(©k) -> R given by Uk(jJ.k) = f |nc(yk) 6k(dyk) Mk(d9k)- TTie expected rewardfunction u:jYk
ek
n(6) X X -^ R, is defined by u((jii
, H2), xk) = Uk(Wc)-
To define the transition probability cp: 11(0) x X - P{n{S)), we need to develop some notation for Bayesian
updating. Analogous to the definition of T in Section in, the arm k updating maps Tk: /'(©k) ^ Yk -> /'(©k). k =
1, 2, are chosen so that- (i) Fk is jointly measurable, and (ii) for each Hk ^ ''(©k). rk(^^k. ) is a regular version of
conditional probability. The updating maps Fkn: /'(©k) ^^k^ /"(©k) are recursively defined by: (i) Fk^Jik.
Wk) = rk(lik, 7Ck(l. <%)) and, (ii) for n > 1. Tkndtk. f%) = rk(rk,n-l(^tk. (»k). tk(n. "k))-
Given that action xk is chosen with prior marginal belief jik, the Bayesian's probability distribution over next
period marginal posterior beliefs is 4'K(lik) e pH^), where the map H'k: /"(©k) -^ ''^(©k) is constructed as
follows. For ^k e ''(©k) and B g fi(/'(©k)), define v>(^k. B) = Fk"Vk. •)(B). Since \)(Hk. B) g B(Yk). the map
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9k -* 6k(v(Mk. B)) is measurable and ^k(Uk)(B) = J9k(v(^k. B)) |Ak(d6k)- We can now define the transition
ek
probability (p: n(e) x X -> P(n(,e)) by:
<p(Oil. U2). xiXAi X A2) = 4'iaii)(Ai)lA2(^2).
and
<P((^il. Vi2), X2)(Ai X A2) = 4'2ai2){A2)lAiail).
for Ai e B{P(ei)), A2 e fi(/'(©2)) and Ia^C) the indicator fiinction.
A po/icy is a sequence {X(t)} such that there exists a (unique) admissible plan [(X(t)), {Y(t)), {Ci(t)}, {C2(t)},
{//,)]. The set of policies is denoted by 5. Given (X(t)) e E and prior belief ^l(0) = (iii(O), ^2(0)) e 0(9), there is
an induced sequence (|a(t)) = {tii(t), ^2(0) of state variables (posterior beliefs), where |ik(t): Q -> /'(Bk). For t > 1.
^k(t) is defined by: (i) if X(t-l)((o) = xk, then ^k(t)(co) = rk(Hk(t-l), nk(Ck(t). o)), and (ii) if X(t-l)(co) ^ xk. then
^k(t)(co) = Wc{t-l)(u).
For a 6 (0. 1) and n(0) e 0(9), a policy {X(t)) with corresponding posterior sequence {Oi(t)} is (^(0), a) DP-
optimal if for any policy {X'(t)} with corresponding posterior sequence {li'(O):
Za'u(n(t)(co), X(t)(a))) Pn(0)(dco) >
t=0
Ia'u(ji'(t)(co), X'(t)(o))) P^i(0)(dco).
t=0
A seemingly obvious, but non-trivial fact is that for a 6 (0, 1) an admissible plan [{X(t)), {Y(t)}, {Ci(t)}, (€2(1)}.
(//,)] is (^, a) opumal (as defined in Section 4.3) iff {X(t)) is (ji, a) DP-optimal. Formally, this result follows
from Theorem 7.3 of Reider (1975).
For a = 0, the above definition of optimality would not useful since it would impose no restrictions on
behavior after period 0. Associating a = with repeatedly myopic behavior, we define a policy {X(t)) with
corresponding posterior sequence (^(t)} to be (^(0), 0) DP-optimal if for all t, u(ji(t), X(t)) > u(>L(t), x^), P^(0) a.s..
A policy {X(t)) with associated posterior maps (|J.i(t)), {|J.2(0} is stationary if there exists ^ policy function
%: n(e) -» X such that % is measurable and for all t, X(t) = ^(Hi(t), H2(t))- If (X(t)) is stationary and DP-optimal,
then the policy function ^ is an optimal policy function. Applying standard results in dynamic programming (see
e.g., Blackwell (1965) or Maioa (1968)) it is routine to verify that an optimal, stationary policy exists.
We now restate some standard dynamic programming results in the context of our model. For discount factor a,
the valuefunction V: P{Q) —> R is defined by
C°°
V(n) = sup{X(t))e^ { Za'u(M(t)((0). X(t)(o))) P^(do))]
J 1=0
Q.
where {M.(t)) denotes the posterior sequence corresponding to {X(t)). V satisfies the Bellman or optimality equation
(see e.g. Blackwell (1%5, Theorem 6 (e))):
Vai) = Maxx€x{uai.x) + a- |V(m') cpOi, x)(du') )
•
0(9)
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Additionally, ^ is an optimal policy function iff it solves the optimality equation (Blackwell [1965,
Theorem 6 (01). That is for all n e 0(9):
VOi) = uOt, ^Ot)) + a- Jvat')9(M,^ai))(dM').
n(e)
4.5. Gittens Index Characterization of Optimal Policy
There is a simple characterization of optimal policies, based upon initial results of Gittens and Jones (1974), and
subsequent refinements by Berry and Fristedt (1985), Ross (1983) and Whittle (1982). Gittins and Jones proved the
existence of functions Mi: /"(Gj) -» R and M2: /'(©i) -> R with the property that it is optimal to choose arm 1 in
period t iff Mi(^i(t)) > M2(M2(0)- The function Mk is commonly referred to as the Gittins Index for arm k.
To motivate the definition of M^ consider a one-armed bandit problem where in the initial stage the decision-
maker has the option of playing arm 1 or stopping and collecting a terminal reward of m. In subsequent stages,
assuming arm 1 has been played in all previous stages, the options remain selecting arm 1 or stopping and receiving
a final payment m. The value of the Gittins Index for belief |ik is the terminal reward m such that the decision-maker
is indifferent between between continuing and stopping.
More precisely, denote the set of stopping times on (Qk. Pk] as 5^ = {x: Q^ -» No, T'H(n)) € Fkn)- The
expected total reward of the stopping time policy x with terminal payoff m and belief (ijc € /'(©k) is given by the
function Tfe:^ x /'(Ok) x R -> R, defined by
' x(o>k)-1
Tk(t,^ik,m)= [[ X«'rk(t^t+l)] + a^('^)Tn]Pk4ik(d<^-
t=0
"k
The value of the optimal policy is Vk(Hk, ni) = Sui>x6.^(Tk(t, Hk. n™)}- Recalling that Ck = ess sup(rk(yk)). it is
routine to verify that for all ^k ^ ^(^). Vk()ik. m) = m for all m > Ck-(1 - a)"^. The Gittins Index is defined by
Mk(Mk) = inf{m: Vk(p.k. m) = m). A characterization of the optimal policy in terms of the Gittins Index is given by
the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 4.1. A policy (X(t)) with posterior maps (m(t)). (^2(0) is OnCO), [i2(0))-optimal iff X(t)(ci)) = xk
whenever Mk(M.k(tXw)) > Mj(jij(t)(a))).
Proof. WhitUe (1982, Theorem 14.4.1).
Throughout the remainder of the paper we assume that the Bayesian controller follows an optimal stationary
policy {X(t)) with posterior maps {^ll(t)), {^2(1)), and poUcy function ^: 11(0) -> X defined by ^(()ii(t), H2(t))) = M
iff Mi(p.i(t)) > M20J.2(t)). For a more detailed development of the Gittens Index and the optimality of the Index
policy, the texts of Ross (1983), Whitde (1982), and Berry and Fristedt (1985) are recommended
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5. GENERIC LIMIT THEOREMS
5.1. Some Continuity Results
Preparatory to proving the genericity theorems, some preliminary technical results are developed in this
subsection. The principal result is the establishment of the continuity of the functions Mi and M2. The first step is
to develop characterizations of Vi and V2 by making use of the fact that these value functions are solutions to the
optimality equation.
LEMMA 5.L The function V^: P{'&)d x R ^ R w continuous, for k = 1, 2.
Proof. Without loss of generality we consider the case of k = 1. We first note that an easy consequence of Lemma
A.5. is that *Pi is continuous. Let C(f(6i)) denote the space of bounded, continuous real-valued functions on P{Q\)
endowed with the sup norm. Since u(^i, ^2. ''l) is independent of |i2. we may define uiOij) = u(jii, p.2. ^l)- For
each me R, define the mapping
-dm: C{P{Q\)) -» C(f(8i)) by i^mCOCM^l) = max{m, ui(p.i) +
a- k(Yl) ^l(Ul)(dYi)). (The continuity of i3m(C(")) follows from the continuity of ui and I'l. ) By standard
arguments one can verify that -6^. 'S a contraction mapping with modulus a. Therefore the fixed-point of -Q^ is a
continuous function of m. Since Vi(-, m) is the fixed-point of Em, the map (p.i, m) —> Vi^Oij, m) is continuous.
LEMMA 5.2. For k = 1,2, and \i\^ e /"(Bk), the map m —> [V^diij, m) - m] is decreasing.
Proof. Replacing sums with integrals, the proof of Ross (1983, Lemma VII.2.1) remains valid.
Recall that 4'k(lik) is the Bayesian's probability distribution over next period beliefs on ©k. given that arm k is
chosen and |i.ic is the current belief. Define W^: /'(6k) x R -> R by Wk(tik. "i) = Uk(^k) +
« jVk(|ik'. m) *i'k(M-k)(Mk')- Wk(Wc. m) is the expected reward for the one-armed bandit problem with the option
P{^
of stopping and receiving a payoff of m after the initial period.
LEMMA 5.3. (i) Wj and W2 are continuous, (ii) Mk()J4c) <^iff Wk(]Xk, m) < m.
(i) This follows from the continuity of 4'k and Lemma 5.1.
(ii) Suppose Wk(u, in) < m. By definition of Wk, m > Uk(M) + "• J Vk(M-', m) 4'k(li)(d^i')- Since Vk is continuous
(Lemma 5.1) and increasing in m, ( iri - e> ukdi) + aj Vk(M'. m - e) 9k(U)(d|J.') for e sufficiently small. But this
last inequality is, by definition, equivalent to Mk(ji) < m - e < m.
For the converse, suppose Mk(M) = m < m. Since m is a terminal payoff for which the decision-maker is
indifferent between continuing play and quitting, Wk(Ji, m) = Vk(ji, m) = m. From Lemma 5.2, for all )i e P(ek),
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Vk(ji, m) - Vk(^i, m) < (m - m), implying that /[Vk(n', m) - Vk(|i', m)] cpkOiXd^i') < (m - m). Finally, we have
that;
Wk(M, m) = uk® + a-jVk(M'. m) ^PkC^LXduO
= uk(M) + a{JVk(n'. m) 4'k(ii)(d^') + JVkOt', S) nODCduO - JVkOi'. m) ^(iiXd^'))
= {uk(M) + aJVk(^', S) 4'k(ii)(dM')} + a{JVkai'. m) H'kOiXd^') - JVkOi'. m) 4'k(^iXd^l'))
= Si + a- {JVk(n'. m) 4'kai)(d;t') - /Vk(n'. m) ^kOiXd^'))
< m + a(ni - in)
< m.
PROPOSITION 5.4. Mi and M2 are continuous.
Proof. First we establish that M^ is lower-semicontinuous by verifying that for all c g R the set
[\i e P{Q\i): MkOi) > c) is open. Suppose that MkCJi) > c. By definition of Mk, VkCJI, c) - c > 0. From the
continuity of Vk (Lemma 5.1), 3 an open neighborhood /V of ji such that for all ^ g TV, Vk(jL, c) - c> 0. Therefore,
for all |i G N, VkOi., c) - c> and so Mk(n) > c.
Upper-semicontinuity is confirmed by demonstrating that the set (|i g /"(©k): MkOx) < c) is open for all c g R.
Suppose that Mk(ii) = m < c. By Lemma 5.3, Wk(M., c) < c and 3 an open neighborhood / of [I such that for
H G 7, WkOi, c) < c. But this implies that Mk(ji) < c.
5.2. Generic Outcomes when bi 5"! b2
In this subsection we analyze the limit behavior of the decision-maker for the case where bi ?!: b2 (recall that bk
= ess inf{rk(yk): yk ^ Yk)). Without loss of generality we assume that bi < b2. To motivate the next result, choose
a set Yo c Yi with vi(Yo) > and sup{ri(yi): yi g Yq) < b2. So if at time t, the decision-maker's conditional
probability of an outcome in Yq occurring if arm 1 is selected is sufficiently large, arm 2 will be selected regardless
of H2(0; and so arm 2 will be selected at all times t' ^ L From Theorem 3.10 we can conclude that there is a residual
seti^i eGi x /"(Si) with the following property. If(0i,|ii)G ^i,m is the prior belief on (61, B(©i)), and arm
1 is played sufficiently often, the decision-maker will eventually, Poj a.s., become sufficiently pessimistic that arm
1 will never be tested again. Consequently, arm 1 will be played only finitely often.
To formalize the above remarks, we begin by defining Yq as above. Choose mo g /'(61) such that M-lo(Yo) =
1. For e > define an open neighborhood Ge c /'(©i) of mo, by Ge = (m g P(Q\): P()ii, mo) < e)
.
LEMMA 5.5. There exists oO, such thatfor all z<c, supmeGglMidli)] < inf^2eP(©2)^^2(^l2)}•
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Proof. First observe that: (i) inf(M2(M2): W g /"(©l)) = ^. and (ii) Mi(nio) < ^I^ . Since Mi is continuous, J =
{|il € /'(Si): MiOii) < T^} is open. So 3 c such that for e < c, Ge c J. And so for m g Gg c J, and any |i2 g
P{Q2)> MiOil) < ^ ^ M2ai2)-
PROPOSITION 5.6. Suppose \>\ < b2. Then there exists a residual subset ^i c ©i x f (©i) such that for
(01, ni(0)) e ^i and ail (82, H2(0)) e ©2 x ^(©2). P9 a-^- X(t)(o}) = xi only finitely ofien.
Proof. Invoking Lemma 5.5, choose an open set Gg such that Mi(m) < M2(^2) for all Oii, (12) ^ Gg x /'(©2).
Define the set QiecQi by nie= (coi e fii: rin(ni(0), ©i) « Gg. foralln= 1,2, ...}. Defme^i = ((9i,
Hl(0)) c ©1 xP(©i): Pej(Qie) = 0}. By Theorem 3.10, i?i is residual.
5.3. Generic Outcomes when bi = b2.
When bi = b2, the "typical" outcome will be that the decision-maker will start out playing one arm, but will
eventually become sufficiently pessimistic regarding the first choice and switch to the other arm. Eventually, though
she will become sufficiently regarding the non-initial arm and switch back to the original arm. This switching back
and forth will continue forever.
PROPOSITION 5.7. Suppose bi = b2 = b and vk({yk: ric(yk) ^i^ b)) > 0. Then there is a residual setR czBx n(©)
such that Pe a.s., X(t) = xj infinitely often and X(t) = X2 infinitely often.
Proof \je.lRk = {(Ok, tik(O)) e ©k x Pk(©): POk a.s, limsupnrkn(^k(0), C0k)(G) = 1, for all open G c ©k). By
Theorem 3.10, Rk is residual, and so 7? = ^7 x /?2 is residual. Now choose (9i, ^i(O), 02, |i2(0)) e R, and define Ei
= {co: supt Ci(t)((o) is finite). Ei is the (O-set for which arm 1 is played only finitely, given the optimal policy
starting from beliefs Oii(O), |i2(0))- Because of the symmetry of the specification, it suffices to fffove that Pe(Ei) =
0. For 0) € El, define the terminal value of the Gittens index for arm 1 as mioo(co) = Mi(ri_Ci(t)(co)(M^l(0). Wi)).
Since (9i, ni(0)) e Ri, Pe(Ei n (co: mi„(ci)) = ^ )) = 0. Now let E2 = ((0)1,0)2): Iimsupnr2nat2(0), 0)2)(G) =
1, for all open G c ©2), and by Theorem 3.10, Pe(E2) = 1. By the continuity of M2, Ei c (Ei n (co: mi„(a)) =
Y^})u-E2,andsoP9(Ei) = 0.H
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In Section 3, we demonstrated the asymptotic sensitivity of posterior beliefs with respect to a prior priobability
on a parameter space which is not finite dimensional. These results have significance for Bayesian statistical decision
theory. Since posterior beliefs are not robust to small perturbabtions of the prior, the optimal action correspondence
is similarly non-robusL If two Bayesians have identical objective or loss functions, nearby prior beliefs and observe
the same sequence ofoutcomes, without additional restrictions, it would not be pathological for them to each choose
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actions that the other evaluated as markedly inferior to their own choice. The bandit example, developed in Sections
4 and 5 of this paper, illustrates this phenomena in a context where beUefs do, in fact, affect outcomes.
For stochastic processes that might be generated by more complex feedback between beliefs and actions, such
as rational expectations models with learning, no formal demonstration is provided of generic nonconvergence of
beliefs and outcomes. Nevertheless, it would be surprising (at least to this author) if the additional complexity of
such models, somehow restored the aymptotic regularity attained in analyses conducted firom the perspective of the
Bayesian learner.
Economic theorists who wish to model learning by Bayesian economic agents are confronted with three options.
One alternative is to impose no restrictions upon agent beliefs and analyze the resulting stochastic process from the
perspective of a classical statistician who knows the true parameter. With sufficiently specific assumptions on other
parameters of the model (such as preferences and technology) it may be possible show that agents with consistent
priors will eventually be financially dominant-', and presumably then the limiting price process would be
indistinguishable from the price process emanating from a model in which all agents had consistent priors. Even so,
there would remain the question as to whether any such asymptotic properties would be robust under arbitrarily small
perturbations of parameter values and initial beliefs.
A second alternative would be to follow the currently predominant practice of adopting the probabilistic vantage
point of the Bayesian agent(s), imposing no restrictions on agent beliefs. A drawback with this approach is that it
provides no basis for drawing distributional inferences for any particular parameter value of agent prior probability
zero. The resulting Umit theorems can be interpreted as predictions by the economic theorist only if the theorist's
beliefs are absolutely continuous with respect to the agent's beliefs. So unless the reacter also has beliefs absolutely
continuous with respect to the agent's, there are no grounds for accepting the agent's asymptotic predictions.^
The fmal option, one that I endorse, is to narrow the set of candidate prior beliefs, a strategy that is adopted by
Bikhchandani and Sharma (1990). To motivate this strategy, consider the bandit problem studied in Sections 4 and 5,
and for simplicity suppose that Yi and Y2 are each countable. If I was the decision-maker, I might fmd it difficult to
exactly specify my prior, but I would reject any prior belief for which there was a residual 0-set A, such that for all
€ A, with P9 probability one my beliefs would not converge. In particular, I would require that for any arm played
infinitely often, the Prohorov (or bounded Lipschitz) distance between my posterior beliefs and the sample
distribution converge to zero. And while acknowledging that introspective reasoning has its limitations, I believe
that few individuals would behave as predicted by Propositions 5.6 and 5.7. More generally, in environments where
consistent estimators are available, the modeller should assume that priors are chosen from the family of probability
measures that are consistent for all 9 e 0.
This is philosophically similar to the "what ir method advocated by Diaconis and Freedman (1986) for
Bayesian statisticians. Diaconis and Freedman suggest that "... after specifying a prior distribution, generate
imaginary data sequences, compute the posterior, and consider whether the posterior would be an adequate
representation of the updated prior." Adapting this reccommendation to the context of economic modelUng, it would
be natural to require that agents have prior beliefs with full support and that the sequence of agent posterior beliefs
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converges almost surely with respect to the measure P9 for all 9 € 9. The feasibility of such a strategy requires the
existence of consistent priors. Unfortunately, endogenous learning will typically imply a non-stationary stochastic
process. And there are few results currently available on the Pq consistency (or convergence properties) of Bayes
estimates fw such processes.^ Further research on sufficient conditions on priors for Pq consistency is needed.
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Appendix
For simplicity we explicitly prove Proposition 3.5 for n = 1. The argument for the n-fold product space is
essentially identical and is briefly sketched.
We start by defining for A € fi(Z), the function f^: A ^ R by fa(^) = Jh(X, z) v(dz).
A
LEMMA A.l. fA w a bounded Lipschitzfunction, and llfAllBL ^ 3.
Proof. The Lipschitz norm is defined by llfAllL = sup5^^;^'{lfA(X) - fAC^OI/CdlCX, X')]. Since
IfAM - fAi^y ^ IHK z) - h(X', z)l v(dz) < 2di(X, XO < 2,
A
the Lipschitz norm exists and llfAllL ^ 2. Since llfAlloo = supji lfA(X)l = 1, the bounded Lipschitz norm llfA"BL =
l'fA"L + llfAlloo exists and HfAllBL ^ 3.
LEMMA A.2. For
^i, \i € Pi\) if Hi => 1^ then {supA[l |fA d(^ii - H)I: A e fi(Z)} -> 0.
A
Proof. Recall that the Dudley metric P is defined by P()i, y) = sup{ljf d(n - y)I: llflleL ^ 1 ) and that ^j => ^ iff P(Hi,
(J.) -* 0. So by Lemma A.l, |Xn => H implies {supA[l JfA d(Mn - M^)l: A e S(Z)) -» 0.B
A
For H € P{A) define the probabUity P^ on (Z x A. fi(Z) x ^CA)) by Pji(A x B) = jfA(X) p.(d>.). Also define the
B
marginal probability Q^ on (Z. B(Z)) by Q|i(A) = P^(A x A). Now fix a sequence |ii => h e P(A) and define Li(z) =
Jh(X, z) |ii(dX) and L(z) = jh(K, z) tJ.(dX). Li(z), L(z) are the Radon-Nikodym derivatives of Q^- and Q^ with
A A ^
respect to v.
LEMMA A.3. Li() -4 L() in v measure.
Proof |Li(z) v(dz) = r Jh(X, z) ni(dX) v(dz) = f |h(X. z) v(dz) tii(dX)
A Ja Ja
A A
= jfA(X) ^li(dX) ^ JfAa)n(dX)= JUz)v(dz).A
Furthermore, by Lemma A.2, the convergence is uniform in A. The conclusion follows from Remark 3.1 of
[Strasser, 1985 #57].
For B 6 B(A), define Li(B, x) = Jh(X, z) w(dX) and L(B, z) = jh(X, z) ^l(dX)
B B
LEMMA A.4. If B e B(A) and n(aB) = 0, then Li(B, z) ^ L(B, z) in v measure.
Proof. First consider the case where |i.(B) > 0. It suffices to verify that I JLjCB, z) v(dz) - JL(B, z) v(dz)l ->
A A
uniformly in A. Let B(B) denote the Borel sets restricted to B. Define (iiCB) = ai; and define y[ on (B, fi(B)) by Yi(C)
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= ai"' ^i(C), for C e B(B). Similarly, define a = ^(B) and define y on (B, B(B)) by 7(C) = sr^\i(C). Observe that
|Li(B. z) v(dz) = ffA(X) mCdX) and that /L(B.z)v(dz)= jfA(X) ^l(dX). So
A B A B
I jLi(B, z) v(dz) - JL(B, z) v(dz)l
A A
= l|fAWaiy.(dX)- JfAW7(d>.)l
B b
< I JfA(X)ai r.(dX) - |fA(X) ri(d>.)l + I IfA(X) Yi(d>.) - JfA(>.) "Kd^^)!.
B B B B
Since IfAl is bounded, I jfA(^)ai TiCdX) - JFaC^) yi(d>-)l -> independenUy of A. Substituting Ti and y for (li and n
B B
in Lemma A.2.. supA€B(A){l JfA(^)ai Yi(dX) - |fA(>-) 7(d>-)l) ^ 0.
B B
If ^(B) = then observe that Li(z) = Li(B, z) + Li(~B. z) and L(z) = Li(B, z) + Li(-B, z). Since B is a n-
continuity set, -B is also a n-continuity set. So by application of the above and Lemma A.3, Li(B, ) -> L(B, •) in
V measure.
LEMMA A.5. Suppose [i e P(A) and pick e > 0. Let.^= {Ai, A2, ...) be a disjoint cover of A, with diameter of
e t'
At < 8 = - Defuie Bj' = U(lj At, and choose T so that h(Bt) > 1 - 8. If y g P(A) and
^{Iti(AL) - 7(At)l} < ST-l, then P(^, y) < e.
Proof. Let g e BL(A, di) with llgllfiL ^ 1- It suffices to prove that I jg d^i - jg dyl < e. Define af = inf{g(X): X e
A A
£
At), define bt = sup {giX): Xe At), and note that bt - at < 8. Since jg dy > [ti(At) - z;]at, and Jg dii <
At
*
At
[M,(At)]bt, it follows that jg d|i - jg dy < 8(i(At) + ~
At At
Similarly, jg dy - jg d^ < 8n(At) + |. So I jg dy - jg dul < 8ii(At) + |,
At At At At
and I jg dy - jg dnl < 8|i(BT) + 8 < 28.
Br &r
It remains to bound the difference of the integrals over -Bj. Since < 7(~Bt) < 28, I jg d^. - jg dyl < 28
~&r -Br
+ 8. So I jg dn - jg dTl < 58 = E.
A A
PROPOSITION A.6. Suppose n, ^i e P+{A) and \ii => [JL. Then r(^i. z), r(pi, z) e P+CA) v a.s., and
r(W.) -^ f(M.) in v-measure.
Proof. Verification that r(^i, z), r{\i, z) e /'+(A) is routine and so omitted. Pick e > 0, and as in Lemma A.S, let
~^= { Ai, A2, ... ) be a disjoint cover of A with diameter of At < 8 = 7 and |J.(9At) = 0. (The existence of such a
collection follows from Theorem 1 1.7.3. of Dudley (1989).) Define Bt as in Lemma A.S, and choose T s.L M.(Bt) >
1 - 8. Observe that v a.s., r(p.i, z)(At) = \ /', , which is well-defined since ^i e P+(\) and so Li(z) > 0.
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Applying Lemmas A.3 and A.4, we have ,
'
-> ,
'
in v-measure. Since Bj is the union of a finite number
of At sets, by Lemma A.5, we have limsupi v({z: PCTOij, z), FOi, z)) > e} = 0. Since e is arbitrary, M(Z„P(rOii, z),
rai,z))) v(dz) -> 0.
PROPOSITION A. 7. Suppose H, Hi e /'+(A), |ij => |i, f: A -^ R is bounded and continuous, and
Xi -> X € (A, di). Then f J[f(X) r(ni, z)(dX)] h(Xi, z) v(dz) -* r|[f(X) ^(^l, z)(dX)] h(X. z) v(dz).
Z Z
Proo/. Define 9,, (p: Z -> R by 9i(z) = Jf(X) TOi.,, z)(dX) and 9(z) = Jf(X) rCp.,, z)(dX). By Proposition A.6, 9;
A A
^ 9 in v-measure. Since 19;! and l<J)l are uniformly bounded by llfll, and h(Xi, •) -> h(X, •) in L^(Z, B(Z), v),
9ih(Xi, •) -* 9h(X, •) in L^(Z, B(Z), v). So j(pi(z)h(Xi, z) v(dz) —> |9(z)h(X, z) v(dz), or equivalently,
Z Z
r j[f(X) r(Hi, z)(dX)] h(Xi, z) v(dz) -> r|[f(X) rOt, z)(dX)] h(X, z) v(dz).
Proof of PROPOSITION 3.5. Fix k and m. For n = 1, setting f = gicmn. the result follows directly from Proposition
A.7. For n > 1, repeat the above arguments replacing z with a and v with v".
FOOTNOTES
^Some authors allow for heterogeneous beliefs across agents.
^The definition of an optimal plan when a = will be provided in the next subsection.
^I am indebted to Neil Wallace for this observation.
^The above remarks are also applicable to nonparametric Bayesian econometrics. If the reader of a Bayesian statistical
analysis has a prior not absolutely continuous with respect to the author's prior (and the prior is not consistent for
all parameter values), even with large samples there may be no merging of posterior beliefs. For a more complete
discussion of these issues is provided by-Diaconis and Freedman (1986).
^Barron (1988) has recendy proven results for stationary stochastic processes. Barron's techniques are potentially
extendable to processes where endogenous learning generates the non-stationarity.
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